The human capacity to compute the likelihood that a decision is correct -known as 2 metacognition -has proven difficult to study in isolation as it usually co-occurs with decision-3 making. Here, we isolated post-decisional from decisional contributions to metacognition by 4 combining a novel paradigm with multimodal imaging. Healthy volunteers reported their 5 confidence in the accuracy of decisions they made or decisions they observed. We found 6 better metacognitive performance for committed vs. observed decisions, indicating that 7 committing to a decision informs confidence. Relying on concurrent electroencephalography 8 and hemodynamic recordings, we found a common correlate of confidence following 9 committed and observed decisions in the inferior frontal gyrus, and a dissociation in the 10 anterior prefrontal cortex and anterior insula. We discuss these results in light of decisional 11 and post-decisional accounts of confidence, and propose a generative model of confidence 12 in which metacognitive performance naturally improves when evidence accumulation is 13 constrained upon committing a decision. 14 3 Introduction 15 Upon making decisions, one usually "feels" that a given choice was correct or not, which 16 allows deciding whether to commit to the choice, to seek more evidence under uncertainty, 17 or to change one's mind and go for another option. This crucial aspect of decision making 18 relies on the capacity to monitor and report one's own mental states, which is commonly 19 referred to as metacognitive monitoring (Fleming et al., 2012; Koriat, 2006). One promising 20 venue to unravel the neural and cognitive mechanisms of metacognitive monitoring involves 21 investigating how, and to what extent, humans become aware of their own errors (Yeung & 22 Summerfield, 2012). Typically, volunteers are asked to execute a first-order task under time 23 pressure (e.g., numerosity: which of two visual arrays contains more dots) and afterward 24 perform a second-order task by providing an estimate of confidence in their response ("how 25 sure were you that your response was correct?"). Confidence is formally defined as the 26 probability that a first-order response was correct given the available evidence (Pouget et al., 27 2016). Distinct models have been proposed to explain how confidence is computed: some 28 models consider confidence as a fine-grained description of the same perceptual evidence 29 leading to the first-order decision (Kiani & Shadlen, 2009), sometimes enriched with post-30 decisional processes (Pleskac et al., 2010, Van Den Berg et al., 2016 Fleming et al., 2017). 31
trials were a shuffled replay of active trials, see methods). They were then asked to report 48 their confidence in the observed decision. This allowed us to quantify metacognition for 49 committed (active condition) compared to observed (observation condition) decisions while 50 keeping perceptual evidence, first-order performance, and timing constant across conditions. 51
Both conditions were performed while recording simultaneous electroencephalography 52 (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), to constrain blood-oxygenation 53 level dependent (BOLD) correlates of confidence to electrophysiological processes occurring 54 immediately after the committed or observed decision. 55
Data collection was conducted in view of testing three pre-registered hypotheses 56 (https://osf.io/a5qmv). At the behavioral level, assuming that signals associated with overt 57 decisions inform confidence judgments, we expected confidence ratings to better track first-58 order performance for committed compared to observed decisions. Based on several 59
findings showing a role of action monitoring for confidence (e.g., Fleming & Daw, 2017; 60 Fleming et al., 2015; Faivre et al., 2018) , we expected brain regions encoding confidence 61 specifically for committed decisions to be related to the cortical network involved in action 62 monitoring, and brain regions conjunctively activated in both conditions to reflect a shared 63 mechanism independent from decision commitment. Finally, we expected to find earlier 64 correlates of confidence following committed compared to observed responses, as efferent 65 information is available before visual information (Holroyd and Coles, 2002) . The influence of decision commitment on second-order judgments was assessed by 70 comparing metacognitive performance for committed compared to observed decisions. The 71 first-order task consisted of indicating which of two arrays contained more dots (active 72 condition), or observing a hand making that decision (observation condition) ( Figure 1A) . By 73 design, first-order performance was identical in the two conditions (see Methods), with an 74 average first-order accuracy of 71.2 % (± 1.0 %, 95 % CI, according to a 1up/2down 75 adaptive procedure), first-order response time of 385 ms ± 8 ms, and difference of 13.1 ± 1.7 76 dots between the two arrays. 77
We then turned to second-order performance, quantifying metacognitive performance as the 78 capacity to adapt confidence to first-order accuracy. Confidence was measured on a 79 continuous scale quantifying the probability of being correct or incorrect (ranging from 0: 80 "sure error" to 1: "sure correct"). A mixed effects logistic regression on first-order accuracy as 81 a function of confidence and condition revealed an interaction between confidence and 82 condition (model slope: odds ratios z = 2.90, p = 0.004; marginal R² = 0.69), indicating that 83 the slope between confidence and first-order accuracy was steeper in the active compared 84 to observation condition ( Figure 1B) . This difference in metacognitive performance was 85 present in all participants we tested, and also found when analyzing the data with tools 86 derived from second-order signal detection theory (area under the type II receiver operating 87 curve (AROC): active condition = 0.92 ± 0.02; observation condition = 0.90 ± 0.03; Wilcoxon 88 sign rank test: V = 163, p = 0.03, see SI). In addition, metacognitive performance was 89 correlated between conditions (R² = 0.93, p < 0.001), suggesting partially overlapping 90 mechanisms for monitoring committed and observed decisions. Of note, confidence per se 91 did not differ across conditions (F(1,4772) = 0.01, p = 0.98). 92 6 To assess the contribution of decisional signals to metacognitive monitoring, we ran a linear 93 mixed effects model on first-order response times as a function of confidence, accuracy, and 94 condition. This model revealed a triple interaction (F(1,4742) = 6.05, p = 0.014), 95 underscoring that in the active condition, response times for correct responses correlated 96 negatively with confidence, and response times for errors correlated positively with 97 confidence (F(1,26) = 23.70, p < 0.001, Figure 1C ). No main effect of confidence (F(1,29) = 98 0.02, p = 0.89) nor interaction between confidence and accuracy (F(1,19) = 1.34, p = 0.26) 99 was observed in the observation condition ( Figure 1C ). Together, these results indicate that 100 confidence was modulated by committed but not observed response times, and thus suggest 101 the importance of decisional signals and potentially motor actions to build accurate 102 confidence estimates. 103
To further elucidate the contribution of response times to confidence, we ran follow-up 104 experiments including a third condition in which the first and second-order responses were 105 reported simultaneously on a unique scale. We were able to replicate our finding of higher 106 metacognitive performance between the active and observation condition, and found that 107 metacognitive performance in the active condition was better than when first and second-108 order responses were provided simultaneously. This confirms that the readout of speeded 109 motor actions associated with decision commitment serves subsequently as input to 110 compute confidence. Lastly, to rule out the possibility that increases in metacognitive 111 performance were due to confounding factors between the active and observed conditions 112 (e.g., demand characteristics, visual saliency), we performed the same experiment under no-113 time pressure, and found no difference in metacognitive performance between committed 114 and observed decisions (see SI). Altogether, these results validate our first pre-registered 115 hypothesis that metacognitive performance is better for committed compared to observed 116 speeded decisions, and suggest that action monitoring might play a role in this process. We sought to find the brain regions co-activating with confidence by parametrically 138 modulating a general linear model (GLM) with participants' confidence ratings, as well as 139 response times and perceptual evidence (i.e., the difference in number of dots between the 140 right and left side of the screen) as regressors of no interest (see methods). Because error 141 monitoring and confidence are tightly related (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012) , we deliberately 142 analyzed the neural correlates of confidence without modeling first-order accuracy. Of note, 143 the visual scale we used allowed participants to report their confidence estimate with a 144 single and identical motor action with the left hand across conditions and trials, ruling out 145 motor confounds when analyzing data (see methods). Widespread activity correlating both 146 positively and negatively with confidence was found in the active and observation condition, 147 in line with several other studies (Fleck et al., 2005; Fleming et al., 2012b; Baird et al., 2013; 148 Heereman 2015; Hebart et al., 2016; Morales et al., 2018; Vaccaro & Fleming, 2018) . A 149 complete list of activations can be found in Supplementary Table 1 . In addition, we found 150 that the right precentral gyrus (contralateral to the hand reporting confidence), left insula, 151 and bilateral pMFC were significantly more predictive of confidence in the active than in the 152 observation condition ( Supplementary table 2 ). We then defined the regions commonly 153 activated by confidence in both conditions. A conjunction analysis revealed that the bilateral 154 pMFC, left IPL, precentral gyrus, AI and IFG were negatively correlated with confidence 155 ( Figure 2B ; Supplementary Table 3 ). correlates of confidence occurring exclusively within five hundred milliseconds after the first-170 order response (i.e., post-decisional processes). We first modeled the EEG amplitude time-171 locked to the first-order response as a function of confidence using mixed effects linear 172 regression, with first-order response times and perceptual evidence as covariates of no 173 interest (see methods). In the active condition, we found that EEG amplitude correlated with 174 confidence starting 68 ms following the first-order response over centro-parietal electrodes, 175 resembling a centro-parietal positivity (CPP; Figure 3A Supplementary Table 4 ). The coronal view shows significant 224 differences between the active and the observation condition for the labelled region (AI for the early time window 225 and aPFC for the late time window).
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The regions co-activating with decoded confidence in the early time window included the 228 bilateral pMFC, the left IFG, AI and MFG ( Figure 3C, left) . For the late time window (Figure  229 3C, right), coactivations with low decoded-confidence were found in the bilateral pMFC and 230 IFG, the left precentral gyrus, IPL, AI, MFG and aPFC for the active condition, and in the left 231 IFG for the observation conditions ( Supplementary Table 4 ). The left IFG was thus 232 commonly activated by low decoded-confidence in both conditions. Differences between co-12 activations in the active and observation condition were found in the anterior insula (AI) in 234 the early time window and in the aPFC in the late time window ( Figure 3C ; Supplementary 235 Table 4 ). 236 237
Behavioral modeling 238
In view of obtaining a mechanistic understanding of the way decisional and post-decisional 239 evidence contribute to confidence, we derived confidence in committed and observed 240 decisions using a race accumulator model, considered to be biologically plausible 241
representations of evidence accumulation in the brain (Bogacz et al., 2006; Gold and 242 Shadlen, 2007) . Such models assume that ideal observers commit to a first-order decision 243 (D; Figure 4A ) once one of two competing evidence accumulation processes (here, 244 corresponding to evidence for the left or right choice) reaches a decision. 245
We first fitted five parameters (i.e., drift, bound, non-decision time, non-decision time 246 variability and starting point variability, see methods) to first-order choice accuracy and 247 response times recorded for each participant during the active condition. With these 248 parameters, we simulated pairs of competing evidence accumulation trajectories leading to 249 first-order choices and response times. We then derived confidence based on a mapping of 250 the state of evidence of the winning accumulator, following recent findings that confidence is 251 based solely on evidence supporting the decision (Peters et al. 2018; Zylberberg et al., 252 2012) . To account for changes-of-mind, we sampled accumulated evidence after a post-253 decisional period (tpd in Figure 4A ; Peskac and Busemeyer, 2010; Van Den Berg et al., 254 2016) corresponding to the average peak decoding accuracy found with EEG (see previous 255 section). The sampled evidence was mapped to the range of confidence ratings using a 256 sigmoidal transformation with two additional free parameters controlling for bias and 257 sensitivity (see methods). 258 13 For the observation condition, we assumed a similar evidence accumulation process, except 259 that choice and response times were independent from the evidence accumulation process, 260 as in our paradigm. Since first-order behavior in the observation condition remained latent by 261 design, we used the parameters fitted for the active condition to simulate a second dataset 262 of pairs of competing evidence accumulation trajectories. We then mapped confidence from 263 a readout of the accumulator with highest evidence after the post-decisional period, but time-264 locked to shuffled observed decisions (oD in Figure 4A ) and response times, as in our 265 paradigm. When observed decisions were incongruent with covert decisions, we inverted the 266 simulated confidence ratings. This model fitted confidence data better than an alternative 267 model for which participants did not make covert decisions and simply readout confidence 268 from the state of evidence of the accumulator corresponding to the computer's choice (log-269 likelihood: -2.13 ± 6.32 versus -2.91 ± 6.65, Wilcoxon sign rank test, p = 0.019). 270
Across participants, our model fitted confidence ratings well (active condition: R² = 0.71 ± 271 0.30; observation: R² = 0.65 ± 0.40; Figure 4B ), suggesting that it represents a plausible 272 mechanism of confidence build-up for speeded decisions. Most importantly, the confidence 273 model for the active condition predicted better metacognitive accuracy than the observation 274 model, consistent with our experimental data ( Figure 4C ). As in the behavioral analysis, we 275 ran a mixed effects logistic regression on first-order accuracy as a function of confidence 276 and condition, which revealed an interaction between confidence and condition (odds ratios 277 z = -4.58, p < 0.001), indicating that the slope between confidence and first-order accuracy 278 was steeper in the active compared to observation condition. Area under the type II receiver 279 operating curve (AROC) was also higher for the active condition (0.95 ± 0.02 vs. 0.93 ± 0.03, 280
Wilcoxon sign rank test, V = 197, p < 0.001). Of note, these differences were not explained 281 by differences in the goodness-of-fit across subjects (R=0.13; p=0.59). We could thus 282 reproduce the lower metacognitive performance found in the observation condition only by 283 detaching the decision process from the evidence accumulation process leading to 284 confidence. 285 The present study evaluated the contribution of decisional signals to metacognition by 305 comparing and modeling confidence judgments for committed and observed decisions, and 306 identifying the neural correlates of confidence with high spatiotemporal resolution. A group of 307 20 healthy volunteers was asked to perform or observe a perceptual task, and then indicate 308 their confidence regarding the accuracy of the committed or observed decisions. 309
14

Better metacognitive performance for committed decisions 310
Participants were able to adjust confidence to the accuracy of their own perceptual 311 decisions, and to the accuracy of decisions they observed. Yet, consistent with our pre-312 registered predictions, committed decisions were associated with a slight but consistent 313 increase in metacognitive performance compared to observed decisions, which supports 314 decision commitment as an additional input for confidence. Of note, this effect could not be 315 explained by differences in terms of perceptual evidence or first-order performance across 316 conditions, which were identical by design (see Methods). A follow-up experiment revealed 317 equivalent metacognitive performance for committed and observed decisions when 318 participants were given more time to perform the first-order task. This indicates that the 319 metacognitive advantage we describe occurred in speeded tasks in which errors are 320 immediately recognized as such (Charles et al., 2013) . By showing the specificity of 321 metacognitive improvement for committed decisions under speeded conditions, this follow-322 up experiment also undermines the possibility that our effect stems from experimental 323 confounds between the active and observation conditions (e.g., demand characteristics, 324 visual saliency), as such confound would likely pertain both to speeded and non-speeded 325 conditions. Last, we found that metacognitive performance in the active condition was better 326 than another condition involving simultaneous first and second-order responses, in which by 327 definition confidence could not be informed by a previous committed decision. This brings 328 another line of evidence that action monitoring plays a role for confidence. 329
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We then turned to computational modeling to shed light on the role of decisional signals for 330 decision monitoring (Kepecs et al., 2008 , Kiani et al., 2009 , Pleskac et al., 2010 , Maniscalco 331 & Lau, 2016 . One biologically plausible (computational account of decision making, called 332 race accumulator model (Bogacz et al., 2006; Kiani et al., 2014) , assumes that ideal 333 observers commit to a first-order decision (here, the right or left side of the screen containing 334 more dots) once one of two competing evidence accumulation processes (for one or the 335 other choice) reaches a decision boundary. We extended these models, assuming a 336 continuation of evidence accumulation after the first-order decision (Van Den Berg et al., 337 2016) . Through this procedure, we found that the path of second-order evidence 338 accumulation in the active condition was constrained by the first-order decision boundary, 339 which translated into confidence estimates with lower variance compared to observed 340 responses which impose no constraint on evidence accumulation (7.24 ± 0.11 vs 9.04 ± 341 0.16, Wilcoxon signed rank test, V = 8, p < 0.001). This prediction was verified a posteriori in 342 our behavioral data, as we found higher variance for confidence ratings in the observation 343 vs. active condition (6.71 % ± 0.92 vs. 7.33 ± 1.15, Wilcoxon signed rank test, V = 45, p = 344 0.024). 345
The notion that committing to (but not observing) first-order decisions sharpens confidence 346 estimates is corroborated by studies showing that metacognitive performance increases 347 when response times are taken into account to compute confidence (Siedlecka, Paulewicz, 348 & Wierzchoń, 2016) , and decreases in case motor actions are irrelevant to the task at play 349 (Kvam et al., 2015) , or when the task-relevant motor action is disrupted by transcranial 350 magnetic stimulation over premotor cortex (Fleming et al., 2015) . The role of motor signals 351 for metacognition is also supported by recent results indicating that confidence increases in 352 presence of sub-threshold motor activity prior to first-order responses (Gadjos et al., 2018) ; 353 and that alpha desynchronization over the sensorimotor cortex controlling the hand 354 performing that action correlate with confidence (Faivre et al., 2018) . Together, these 355 empirical results suggest that confidence is not solely derived from the quality of perceptual 356 evidence, but involves the perception-action cycle. By comparing committed and observed 357 decisions in a controlled way, we could test a direct prediction derived from these studies, 358 and document its neural and computational mechanisms. 359 360
Neural correlates of confidence in committed and observed decisions 361
After assessing the contribution of decision commitment to confidence at the behavioral 362 level, we identified the brain regions at play for monitoring committed and observed 363 decisions by parametrically modulating the BOLD signal by confidence estimates. Besides 364 brain regions activated independently across conditions (Supplementary table 1) , we found 365 that the right precentral gyrus (contralateral to the hand reporting confidence), left anterior 366 insula and bilateral pMFC were significantly more predictive of confidence in the active than 367 in the observation condition (Supplementary table 2) . The involvement of such motor and 368 error detection regions (Carter et al., 1998; Bonini et al., 2014; Bastin et al., 2017) , together 369 with our behavioral and modeling results support the notion that action monitoring serves as 370 input for confidence. This is corroborated by behavioral results from a follow-up experiment, 371
showing that metacognitive performance was better in the active condition compared to a 372 condition in which the first and second-order responses were reported simultaneously on a 373 unique scale. 374
In search for hemodynamic correlates of confidence independent from action commitment, 375 we identified the brain regions conjunctively related to confidence in the active and 376 observation conditions as the pMFC, insula, IFG, IPL and precentral gyrus (See 377 Supplementary Table 3 ). This is corroborated by previous results by Heereman and 378 colleagues (2015), who found the pMFC, insula and IFG to be negatively correlated with 379 confidence during motion and color discrimination tasks, as well as Morales and colleagues 380 (2018), who found the pMFC to be negatively correlated for confidence in perceptual and 381 memory tasks. In addition, IPL activations (Hayes et al., 2011; Kim & Cabeza, 2007 , 2009 382 18 Moritz et al., 2006) and gray matter thickness (Filevich et al., 2018) were shown to correlate 383 negatively with confidence. These regions could represent a substrate for the computation of 384 confidence, stripped from decisional and error correction processes. 385 386 Timing of confidence-related brain activations 387 Due to the low temporal resolution of the BOLD signal, it is worth considering that the above-388 mentioned regions may be contaminated by prerequisites of confidence computation (e.g., 389
quality of numerosity representation, alertness), as well as its by-products (e.g., the act of 390 reporting confidence on the scale). To further isolate the neural correlates at play when 391 computing confidence for committed and observed decisions and pruning out some of the 392 prerequisites and by-products of confidence, we constrained our search to neural events 393 occurring in the vicinity of the committed/observed first-order response by fusing EEG and 394 fMRI data (Debener et al., 2005; Gherman & Philiastides, 2018) . 395
In line with our pre-registered hypothesis, we found early correlates of confidence for 396 committed but not for observed decisions in fronto-central EEG activity resembling the error-397 related negativity (ERN) involved in error detection (Boldt & Yeung, 2015) and in fronto-398 parietal activity resembling the centro-parietal positivity (CPP) involved in evidence 399 accumulation (O'Connell et al., 2012) . To address the possibility that early correlates of 400 confidence in observed decisions do not appear in event-related potentials but involve 401 multivariate electrophysiological patterns, we built a decoder of confidence based on whole-402 scalp EEG. Coherently with the univariate results described above, our decoder could 403 explain confidence better than chance level in the time vicinity of committed decisions (108 404 ms post-response), while significant decoding performance was only attained 353 ms after 405 observed decisions. The absence of early correlates of confidence in the observation 406 condition was expected as participants could not possibly assess first-order accuracy before 407 perceiving the observed decision (Holroyd & Coles 2002 , Van Schie et al., 2004 Iturrate et 408 19 al., 2015) . Of note, decoding performance in the active condition plateaued after the first 409 peak and dropped after around 400 ms, indicating that ongoing processes leading to 410 confidence may be sustained in time. Thus, the computation of confidence may unfold in two 411 waves, an early one specific to the the monitoring of committed decisions, and a later one for 412 computing confidence per se. One possibility is that the early correlate for committed 413 decisions relates to an "all-or-none" automatic error detection system (Charles et al., 2013, 414 although see Vocat et al., 2011 , Pereira et al., 2017 , while the late correlate underlies a 415 fine-grained estimation of second-order signals (Boldt & Yeung, 2015) . 416
We finally examined the properties of early and late correlates of confidence by assessing 417 their BOLD covariates. For that, we parametrically modulated the BOLD signal using the 418 output of a decoding model of confidence based on whole-scalp EEG, hereby obtaining a 419 time-resolved description of fMRI data (Gherman & Philiastides, 2018) . In the active 420 condition, we found that the pMFC, IFG, MFG and insula were co-activated both during the 421 early and late decoding window. These regions are likely to relate to early error processing 422 based on the monitoring of errors/conflicts surrounding the first-order response (Dehaene et 423 al., 1994 , Carter et al., 1998 , Bonini et al., 2014 , Bastin et al., 2017 , Ullsperger et al., 2014 for a review). Furthermore, Murphy and colleagues showed that similar error-related 425 feedback signals from the pMFC inform metacognitive judgments through the modulation of 426 parietal activity involved in evidence accumulation (Murphy et al., 2015) . Other regions 427 including the IPL, precentral cortex and aPFC were found specifically in the late decoding 428 window, which hints to their involvement in late processes at play for the computation of 429 graded confidence estimates. In the observation condition, the only region coactivated with 430 late electrophysiological correlates of confidence was the left IFG, adjacent to the cluster we 431 found in the active condition. This suggests the role of left IFG operating similarly around 432 300 ms whether a decision is committed or observed. Of note, the quest for domain-general 433 mechanisms of confidence (Faivre et al., 2018 , Rouault et al., 2018 is hindered by the fact 434 that our paradigm alternated short blocks of active and observation conditions, which could 435 20 potentially inflate correlations in confidence due to confidence leaks across trials (Rahnev et 436 al., 2015) . 437
By contrast to decision-independent activations in the IFG, the aPFC -commonly referred to 438 as a key region for confidence (Fleming et al., 2010 , 2012 , Morales et al., 2018 see Grimaldi et al., 2015) -was involved in monitoring committed decisions only. The fact 440 that activity in the insula and aPFC were not related to confidence in observed decisions 441 reveals that these regions may underlie a putative role in linking first-order decisional signals 442 allowing early error detection to inform fine-graded confidence estimates derived from the 443 quality of perceptual evidence (Fleming et al., 2018) . Beyond error detection, the aPFC 444 could operate by linking other sources of information to inform confidence, including the 445 history of confidence estimates over past trials (Shekhar et al. 2018) . Although this claim 446 deserves further investigations, it extends a recent proposal by Bang & Fleming (2018) 447 arguing that aPFC is involved in reporting rather than computing confidence estimates per-448 se. 449 450
Conclusion 451
We combined psychophysics, multimodal brain imaging, and computational modeling to 452 unravel the mechanisms at play when monitoring the quality of decisions we make, in 453 comparison to equivalent decisions we observe. Our behavioral and modeling results 454 indicate that committing to a decision leads to increases in metacognitive performance, 455 presumably due to the constraint of evidence accumulation by first-order decisions. By 456 focusing the analysis of neural signals on processes independent from decision-making, we 457 isolated the IFG as a key region contributing to confidence in both committed and observed 458 decisions. We further specified the functional role of the IFG, distinct from a set of regions 459 involved in error processing, and from the insula and aPFC which could potentially inform 460 confidence estimates with the output of such error processing. 461
